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GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Petitioner Labelle Processing Company ("Labelle") appeals an 
adverse decision of the Benefits Review Board ("BRB") of the 
United States Department of Labor ("DOL").  The BRB affirmed the 
decision of an administrative law judge ("ALJ") awarding black-
lung benefits to John Swarrow, a former employee of Labelle.  The 
BRB had jurisdiction to review the final decision of the ALJ 
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as incorporated into the Black 
Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA"), 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., by 30 U.S.C. 
§ 932(a).  We have jurisdiction over the BRB's final order 
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pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C. 
§ 932(a). 
 Labelle advances alternative arguments for reversal:  (1) 
the ALJ's determination that Labelle's former employee was 
entitled to benefits under the BLBA violated principles of res 
judicata; and (2) the ALJ applied the wrong standard in finding 
that the employee had established "a material change in 
conditions," a necessary prerequisite to the filing of a 
duplicate claim under the BLBA.  We hold that res judicata is 
inapplicable in the present context, but we agree that the ALJ 
did not apply the correct standard.  We will therefore vacate the 
award of benefits and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 John Swarrow, Jr., the claimant-respondent, worked as a coal 
miner for over thirty-four years, retiring in June 1985, at the 
age of sixty-three.  Swarrow worked for Labelle from May 1976 to 
June 1985.  In his last position, as a barge loader, he worked in 
a small, very dusty control room, operating the controls to load 
coal from the preparation plant onto a barge.  Other than when he 
was employed as a barge loader (a position that he held for three 
or four years), Swarrow worked in underground mines until he 
retired. 
 Swarrow testified that he retired because of respiratory 
problems, including chronic wheezing and difficulty climbing 
ninety-four stair-steps and a thirteen-step ladder to reach his 
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work station.  Swarrow also testified that he had smoked one pack 
of cigarettes every three to four days for about forty years but 
stopped smoking upon retirement.  Swarrow uses a Proventil0 
inhaler and also takes other medication for his breathing 
problems. 
 On September 16, 1985, Swarrow filed a claim for benefits 
under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et 
seq.  The District Director denied Swarrow's claim on February 
21, 1986, informing Swarrow that he had a right to submit 
additional medical evidence or request a hearing before an ALJ. 
Swarrow subsequently obtained counsel and submitted additional 
medical evidence in support of his claim.  Labelle also submitted 
medical evidence.  After considering the new evidence, the 
District Director reaffirmed the denial of Swarrow's claim on May 
28, 1986. 
 Swarrow submitted the following medical evidence in support 
of his claim:  chest x-rays; six pulmonary function tests; and 
three blood gas studies.  The results from the pulmonary function 
tests (PFTs) and the blood gas studies, standing alone, did not 
establish total disability.0 
                     
0Proventil is the brand name for albuterol, a beta-adrenergic 
bronchodilator, typically administered in the form of an 
inhalation aerosol.  See Physicians' Desk Reference 2280-83 (49th 
ed. 1995). 
0A "qualifying" pulmonary function study or blood gas study 
yields values that are equal to or less than the values set out 
in the tables at Part 718, Appendices B and C.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.204(c)(1), (c)(2).  In the absence of contrary probative 
evidence, "qualifying" test results (i.e. equal to or less than 
the table values) from pulmonary function or blood gas studies 
conclusively establish "total disability" within the meaning of 
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 Swarrow also submitted physicians' readings of the chest x-
rays.  Two doctors, one of whom was a "B reader,"0 found that the 
x-rays showed the presence of pneumoconiosis.  Four other 
doctors, three of whom were "B readers," determined that the x-
rays were negative for pneumoconiosis. 
 In addition, Swarrow submitted the evaluations of several 
physicians who had examined him.  Dr. George Riegel, at the 
request of the DOL, examined Swarrow on November 26, 1985 and 
determined that Swarrow did not suffer from coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis.  In a report dated February 28, 1986, Dr. Thomas 
Morgan, Swarrow's treating physician since May 18, 1983, diag-
nosed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (i.e. pneumoconiosis) 
and concluded that Swarrow was totally disabled due to exposure 
to coal dust.  Dr. Peter Kaplan examined Swarrow on March 21, 
1986 and found no evidence of pneumoconiosis, opining that 
Swarrow was capable of performing the duties of his last job. 
 On May 18, 1987, Swarrow, through counsel, attempted to 
submit additional evidence.0  The DOL, however, returned the 
                                                                  
the regulations.  See Director, OWCP v. Siwiec, 894 F.2d 635, 636 
(3d Cir. 1990) 
0A "B reader" is a physician, often a radiologist, who has 
demonstrated proficiency in reading x-rays for pneumoconiosis by 
passing annually an examination established by the National 
Institute of Safety and Health and administered by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.  See 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.202(a)(ii)(E); 42 C.F.R. § 37.51.  Courts generally give 
greater weight to x-ray readings performed by "B readers."  See 
Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 145 n.16 
(1987); Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273, 1276 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
0Swarrow attempted to submit medical evaluations performed by Dr. 
J.D. Silverman and Dr. Warfield Garson.  Dr. Silverman examined 
Swarrow on April 3, 1987, diagnosing anthracosilicosis and 
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material, advising Swarrow that the new evidence was untimely and 
therefore would not be considered.  Specifically, the DOL wrote, 
in a letter, that the evidence should have been submitted within 
one year from the initial decision denying Swarrow's claim, that 
is, one year prior to February 21, 1987. 
 On October 2, 1989, Swarrow filed a second application, or 
"duplicate claim," for black-lung benefits.  In support of his 
new application for benefits, Swarrow resubmitted the medical 
evidence he had previously submitted or attempted to submit in 
connection with his original claim.  This evidence included the 
reports by Drs. Garson and Silverman, which had been rejected as 
untimely by the DOL and accordingly had not been considered by 
the DOL in its review of Swarrow's original application. 
 Swarrow also submitted new medical evidence, including chest 
x-rays, PFTs, and blood gas studies.  The PFTs and blood gas 
studies did not demonstrate, under the standards set forth in the 
federal regulations, a totally disabling respiratory impairment. 
 Additional medical reports by Drs. Fino and Kaplan were also 
submitted.  Both physicians concluded that Swarrow did not suffer 
from pneumoconiosis.0  Another physician, Dr. Cander, based upon 
                                                                  
obesity.  Dr. Silverman stated that Swarrow was totally disabled 
due to anthracosilicosis caused by exposure to coal dust, and 
further opined that Swarrow would be disabled even if he lost 
weight.   
 Dr. Garson examined Swarrow on June 2, 1986, diagnosing coal 
workers' pneumoconiosis, arteriosclerosis, arthritis and obesity. 
Dr. Garson concluded that Swarrow was totally disabled as a 
result of a combination of his medical problems. 
0Dr. Gregory J. Fino examined Swarrow on October 21, 1987, and 
diagnosed bronchial asthma, asthmatic bronchitis, hypertension 
and a stomach ulcer.  Dr. Fino also opined that Swarrow's asthma 
was unrelated to coal dust exposure. 
8 
his review of Swarrow's medical records, initially diagnosed 
Swarrow as totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis but later 
recanted, stating that "the presence of disabling pneumoconiosis 
has not been established by the information available."0  In 
addition to Drs. Morgan (Swarrow's treating physician), Garson 
and Silverman, two other examining physicians, Drs. Cho and 
Levine, concluded that Swarrow suffered from disabling 
pneumoconiosis.0 
 Finding that Swarrow had not proven "a material change in 
conditions,"0 the District Director denied Swarrow's duplicate 
claim in an order dated February 27, 1990.  On March 6, 1990, 
                                                                  
 Dr. Peter Kaplan examined Swarrow on March 21, 1986, June 
14, 1990, and December 6, 1991.  On all three occasions, Dr. 
Kaplan found no evidence of pneumoconiosis and no lung impair-
ment.  When deposed in 1991, however, Dr. Kaplan admitted that he 
had observed a decrease in Swarrow's lung function since the 1986 
tests, but attributed "some" of this decrease to aging and less 
than maximal effort exerted by Swarrow in performing the test. 
0Dr. Leon Cander, who did not actually examine Swarrow, reviewed 
Swarrow's medical records upon request of the Office of Workers' 
Compensation (OWCP).  After Dr. Cander reported that the records 
indicated disabling pneumoconiosis, the OWCP, on February 2, 
1990, forwarded a "revised" file to Dr. Cander and asked him to 
reevaluate his diagnosis.  Upon reconsideration, Dr. Cander 
submitted a new report on February 12, 1991, withdrawing his 
earlier diagnosis and instead concluding that the medical 
evidence did not establish disabling pneumoconiosis. 
0Dr. Yong Dae Cho examined Swarrow on November 8, 1989, and 
diagnosed disabling restrictive lung disease with hypoxia caused 
by coal dust exposure and obesity.   
 Dr. Macy I. Levine examined Swarrow on May 30, 1989 and 
November 5, 1991.  On both occasions, Dr. Levine diagnosed 
pneumoconiosis, chronic bronchitis and obesity.  Dr. Levine found 
that Swarrow was totally disabled and that the pneumoconiosis had 
been caused by coal dust exposure.  Significantly, in his 1991 
report, Dr. Levine noted that "the pulmonary function test showed 
progression of [Swarrow's] respiratory impairment . . . ." 
0DOL regulations allow the filing of "duplicate claims" where 
"there has been a material change in conditions."  20 C.F.R. 
§725.309(d).   
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Swarrow appealed the denial to the BRB.  On December 5, 1990, the 
BRB remanded Swarrow's claim to the Office of Administrative Law 
Judges, based upon the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Lukman v. 
Director, OWCP, 896 F.2d 1248 (1990),0 for a hearing before an 
ALJ.   
 After a hearing, held on April 9, 1992, the ALJ, finding 
that Swarrow had established "a material change in conditions," 
issued its decision and order on March 31, 1993.  This order 
awarded benefits to Swarrow. 
 Labelle appealed the award to the BRB.  The BRB, on 
September 15, 1994, affirmed the award and denied Labelle's 
motion for reconsideration on January 4, 1995.  This appeal by 
Labelle followed. 
II. 
 The BLBA provides for the payment of benefits to coal miners 
"who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis [also known as 
black lung disease]."  Id. at § 901(a); 20 C.F.R. § 725.1(a). 
Pneumoconiosis is defined under the BLBA as "a chronic dust 
disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and 
pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment."  30 
U.S.C. § 902(b); 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(20).  The "legal" definition 
                     
0Previously, the BRB had held that duplicate claims filed 
pursuant to section 725.309 must be appealed directly to the BRB 
rather than to an ALJ.  Lukman v. Director, OWCP, 10 Black Lung 
Rep. (MB) 1-56 (1987), aff'd on recon., 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 
1-71 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 896 F.2d 1248 (10th 
Cir. 1990).  Consistent with the Lukman rule, Swarrow had 
appealed directly to the BRB.  The Tenth Circuit later reversed 
Lukman, holding that a claimant who filed a duplicate claim had a 
right to a hearing before an ALJ.  Lukman, 896 F.2d at 1254. 
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of pneumoconiosis (i.e. any lung disease that is significantly 
related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal 
mine employment) is much broader than the medical definition, 
which only encompasses lung diseases caused by fibrotic reaction 
of lung tissue to inhaled dust.  See Doris v. Director, OWCP, 938 
F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 Congress granted the Secretary of Labor broad authority to 
promulgate regulations under the BLBA.  30 U.S.C. §§ 932(a), 
936(a); 20 C.F.R. § 725.301-.422; see also Director, OWCP v. 
National Mines Corp., 554 F.2d 1267, 1275 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that validity of regulations will be sustained as long 
as "'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation'") (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 
Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)).  Congress expressly authorized 
the Secretary to establish and operate field offices which 
process claims filed by miners and their survivors.  30 U.S.C. 
§ 901(a). 
 Part 718 of the black lung regulations sets forth the 
criteria for evaluating disability claims filed after March 31, 
1980, or claims filed before that date but adjudicated after 
March 31, 1980.  See id. at §§ 718.2, 725.4(a).  As previously 
stated, Swarrow filed his claim on September 16, 1985.  Under 
Part 718, to obtain benefits, a claimant must establish that (1) 
he is totally disabled (2) due to pneumoconiosis, (3) which he 
contracted as a result of coal mine employment.  See id. at 
§ 718.201-.204; see also Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 
1318, 1320 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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 When a claim is filed, the District Director marshals the 
relevant evidence, schedules medical testing, notifies interested 
parties, and issues a decision awarding or denying benefits.  See 
generally 20 C.F.R. § 725.401-.418.  Any party objecting to the 
District Director's decision may request reconsideration or a 
formal hearing before an ALJ.  Id. at § 725.419, .421. 
 If a party requests a formal hearing, an ALJ will conduct a 
de novo hearing and then issue a decision awarding or denying the 
claim based upon the evidence presented.  Id. at § 725.461(a), 
.476.  Any party dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision and order 
may, within thirty days of the filing of the order (or the filing 
of the denial of a request for reconsideration), appeal the 
decision to the BRB.  Id. at § 725.479-.480. 
 The BRB, a quasi-judicial body composed of five members 
appointed by the Secretary, is authorized to hear "appeals . . . 
from decisions or orders with respect to [black lung] claims for 
compensation or benefits . . . ."  Id. at § 801.102(6); see also 
33 U.S.C. § 921(b); 20 C.F.R. § 801.101-.201.  As an appellate 
tribunal, the BRB reviews the ALJ's decision based upon the 
hearing record.  See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 
U.S.C. § 932(a).  "The [ALJ's] findings of fact . . . shall be 
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole."  Id. 
 A claimant or employer who is "adversely affected or 
aggrieved by a final order of the [BRB]" may appeal that order to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the 
injury occurred by filing a petition for review within sixty days 
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of the issuance of the BRB order.  Id. at § 921(c); 20 C.F.R. 
§ 802.410(a).  See also generally Lukman v. Director, OWCP, 896 
F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 1990) (presenting overview of 
procedure); Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 381-83 (D.C. Cir.) 
(same), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).   
 
III. 
 The Benefits Review Board is bound by an ALJ's factual 
findings "if they are rational, supported by substantial 
evidence, and consistent with applicable law."  Elliot Coal 
Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616, 626 (3d Cir . 1994). 
See also 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as incorporated by 30 U.S.C. 
§ 932(a); Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 619 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion."  Kowalchick, 893 F.2d at 620. 
 We review the Board's decision to determine whether the 
Board properly deferred to the ALJ's fact findings which were 
supported by substantial evidence.  Hillibush v. Department of 
Labor, 853 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1988); Kertesz v. Crescent 
Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1986).  We exercise 
plenary review over questions of law.  Carozza v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 727 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1984).  We will defer, however, to 
the Director's reasonable interpretation of the statute and the 
Department's regulations.  Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 
U.S. 680, 696 (1991); Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 
F.2d 1524, 1527 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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IV. 
 Labelle argues that Swarrow's duplicate claim is barred by 
res judicata principles.  Labelle asserts that "[t]he only 
difference [between Swarrow's duplicate claim and his original 
claim] was that he got more doctors to say he had pneumoconiosis 
and he found a sympathetic ALJ."  Petitioner's Brief at 26. 
According to Labelle, the decisions of the BRB and the ALJ below, 
in essence, "permit unsuccessful claimants to keep filing claims 
until the right mixture of doctors, lawyers and ALJs produce[] an 
award of benefits."  Id.   
 Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action as a prior suit 
that involved the same parties or their privies is barred where 
there has been a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit. 
Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 
504 (3d Cir. 1992).  Although Swarrow's initial claim resulted in 
a final judgment and involved the same parties as his present 
claim, his second claim asserts a new cause of action. 
Consequently, res judicata does not apply and Swarrow's new claim 
is not barred. 
 A claim, even though it is a second claim, in which "a 
material change in conditions" is asserted and established cannot 
be barred when it states a new cause of action.  Of course, new 
factual allegations supporting a previously denied claim will not 
create a new cause of action for the same injury previously 
adjudicated.  See, e.g., Rogerson v. Secretary of Dep't of Health 
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& Human Servs., 872 F.2d 24, 29 (3d Cir. 1989).  In contrast, new 
facts (i.e. events occurring after the events giving rise to the 
earlier claim) may give rise to a new claim, which is not 
precluded by the earlier judgment.  See Lawlor v. National Screen 
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955); Allegheny Int'l, Inc. v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 
1994); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. f 
(1982) ("Material operative facts occurring after the decision of 
an action with respect to the same subject matter may . . . be 
made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first."). 
 The denial of the first claim filed by Swarrow established 
only that Swarrow was not then totally disabled due to 
pneumoconiosis.  See Cooley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 845 F.2d 
622, 624 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that issue to be decided is 
miner's physical condition at the time of the hearing); Klouser 
v. Hegins Mining Co., 6 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-110, 1-115 (Ben. 
Rev. Bd. 1983) (same).  Although it is true that Swarrow is now 
precluded from collaterally attacking the prior denial of 
benefits, Swarrow may file a new claim, asserting that he is now 
eligible for benefits because he has become totally disabled due 
to coal miner's pneumoconiosis and that his disability occurred 
subsequent to the prior adjudication.0 
                     
0Of course, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion, may bar a claimant from relitigating issues decided 
in a previous action.  For instance, if the ALJ had found that 
Swarrow had not established that he was a "miner" under the Act, 
Swarrow may not later relitigate that issue (unless, of course, 
he subsequently worked as a miner). 
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 Labelle contends that because Swarrow did not return to work 
in a coal mine after the denial of his first claim, he cannot, as 
a matter of law, establish a new cause of action.  According to 
Labelle, Swarrow could not contract pneumoconiosis subsequent to 
the initial denial of benefits without further exposure to coal 
dust. 
 Labelle's argument overlooks the fact that pneumoconiosis is 
a latent dust disease.  See Richard Sloane, The Sloane-Dorland 
Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 558 (1987) ("On any given date 
pneumoconiosis may not be detectable . . . . The disease, 
nevertheless, may progress and later destroy sufficient lung 
tissue [to become detectable].").  A latent condition such as 
pneumoconiosis may not become manifest until long after exposure 
to the causative agent (i.e. coal dust).  See The Merck Manual of 
Diagnosis and Therapy (Robert Berkow & Andrew J. Fletcher, eds., 
16th ed. 1992) (explaining that progressive massive fibrosis, a 
form of pneumoconiosis "may develop after exposure has ceased, or 
. . . progress without further exposure"); David V. Bates et al., 
A Longitudinal Study of Pulmonary Function in Coal Miners in 
Lorraine, France, 8 Am. J. Indus. Med. 21, 21 (1985) (observing 
continued, accelerated rates of decline in lung function loss 
after retirement from mining in both smokers and nonsmokers). 
 Indeed, Congress, in enacting the BLBA, recognized the 
perniciously progressive nature of the disease.  See Robert L. 
Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Federal Black Lung Program --
The View from the Top, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 575, 575 (1985) ("Due to 
the insidious nature of progressive occupational respiratory 
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disorders such as pneumoconiosis, Congress found that state 
programs, which were aimed at adjudicating time-definite 
injuries, often precluded recovery due to the running of statutes 
of limitations.").  The DOL, the agency with purview over black 
lung claims, has also noted 
that pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease, and that 
while the symptoms may, on occasion, subside, the 
condition itself does not improve. . . .  
 
. . . [T]he Department has stricken the language of 
proposed § 718.404(a)(1), which required notification 
of the Office if the respiratory or pulmonary condition 
of a recipient of benefits improved.  This change is in 
response to comments and testimony stating that 
pneumoconiosis does not, in fact, improve. . . .  In 
order to reflect the fact that the symptoms of 
pneumoconiosis generally continue, even though 
statutory entitlement may cease, the Department has 
changed the title of this section from "cessation of 
disability" to "cessation of entitlement."  Although 
the Department agrees that the disease does not 
improve, section 22 of the [LHWCA] provides for 
modification of awards on a change in condition or 
mistake in determination of fact.  Subsection (b) of 
this regulation effectuates this provision. 
 
45 Fed. Reg. 13,694 (Feb. 29, 1980) (emphasis added). 
 Moreover, courts have long acknowledged that pneumoconiosis 
is a progressive and irreversible disease.  See Mullins Coal Co. 
v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 151 (1987); Kowalchick v. 
Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1990); accord Back v. 
Director, OWCP, 796 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1986); Orange v. 
Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 1986); 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Chubb, 741 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 
1984); Andryka v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 14 Black Lung 
Rep. (MB) 1-34 (1990); Stanley v. Betty B Coal Co., 13 Black Lung 
17 
Rep. (MB) 1-72 (1990); Belcher v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 6 Black 
Lung Rep. (MB) 1-1180 (1984). 
 Labelle contends, however, that "simple" pneumoconiosis, in 
contrast to its "complicated" form, is not a progressive disease, 
but has submitted no medical evidence to support this assertion. 
In support of the proposition that "[p]neumoconiosis is 
progressive only in its advanced or complicated form," Labelle 
relies entirely on two sources:  Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); and Report of the Surgeon General, The 
Health Consequences of Smoking:  Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease 
in the Workplace (1985) [hereinafter "Surgeon General's Report"]. 
 Usery does not directly support Labelle's contention.  The 
Usery Court, in providing background information about pneumo-
coniosis, merely noted that "the disease is progressive, at least 
in its complicated stage . . . ."  Usery, 428 U.S. at 7-8 
(emphasis added).  The inference that Labelle would have us draw 
(i.e. the disease is not progressive unless in its complicated 
stage) is not warranted.  The Usery Court merely qualified its 
observation that pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease; it did 
not state that "simple" pneumoconiosis cannot progress in the 
absence of exposure to coal dust. 
 Similarly, Labelle's reliance on the Surgeon General's 
Report is misplaced.  The report does state that "[s]imple CWP 
[coal-workers' pneumoconiosis] does not progress in the absence 
of further exposure."  Surgeon General's Report, supra at 294. 
This statement, however, addressed only the progressive nature of 
clinical pneumoconiosis.   
18 
 Legal pneumoconiosis (i.e. pneumoconiosis within the meaning 
of the BLBA) is defined more broadly than the medical (clinical) 
definition of pneumoconiosis.  The legal definition encompasses 
all "chronic pulmonary disease[s] resulting in respiratory or 
pulmonary impairment significantly related to, or substantially 
aggravated by dust exposure in coal mine employment."  20 C.F. R. 
§ 718.201.  "The definition includes, but is not limited to, coal 
workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, 
anthrosilicosis, massive pulmonary fibrosis, progressive massive 
fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis, arising out of coal 
mine employment."  Id. 
 Significantly, the Surgeon General's Report discusses 
chronic bronchitis caused by coal dust exposure but at no point 
suggests that industrial chronic bronchitis cannot progress in 
the absence of continuing dust exposure.  See Surgeon General's 
Report, supra at 183-85, 299-300.  Chronic bronchitis, as a 
chronic pulmonary disease, falls within the legal definition of 
pneumoconiosis. 
 Moreover, even if Labelle had established that "simple" 
pneumoconiosis could not progress without further dust exposure, 
it is far from evident that Swarrow necessarily suffered from the 
simple form of the disease.0  Indeed, implicit in the ALJ's 
                     
0Labelle asserts that "complicated" pneumoconiosis can be 
diagnosed only by x-ray, biopsy or autopsy, citing 30 U.S.C. 
§ 921(c)(3) in support of this contention.  That statutory 
provision, however, does not address the distinction between 
"complicated" and "simple" pneumoconiosis.  The statute merely 
creates an irrebuttable presumption of entitlement to benefits, 
without proof of disability, where the diagnosis of pneumo-
coniosis is established by one of the methods listed in the 
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finding that Swarrow demonstrated "a material change in 
conditions" is the recognition that Swarrow's respiratory ailment 
had progressed until Swarrow was totally disabled. 
 If Swarrow's earlier exposure to coal dust caused his 
present disability and pneumoconiosis was merely latent at the 
time of his initial application for benefits but has since become 
manifest, Swarrow would be entitled to prove that the disease has 
progressed to the point of total disability since the filing of 
his original claim.  Moreover, if the ALJ were convinced by 
Swarrow's proofs (and if the ALJ's findings were supported by 
substantial evidence), Swarrow would be entitled to receive black 
lung benefits.  In sum, we reject Labelle's argument that 
Swarrow's duplicate claim is barred by res judicata. 
 
V. 
 Labelle argues, in the alternative,0 that the ALJ applied 
the wrong standard in determining whether Swarrow demonstrated "a 
material change in conditions."  The ALJ applied the standard 
enunciated by the BRB in Spese v. Peabody Coal Co., 11 Black Lung 
Rep. (MB) 1-174 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1988) (per curiam).  Labelle notes 
                                                                  
provision.  See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3).  Swarrow did not rely on 
that presumption but rather submitted proof that he was totally 
disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 
0Labelle also argues, in the alternative, that the ALJ's decision 
must be reversed because the ALJ failed to satisfy the 
factfinder's duty of explanation.  In its brief, Labelle fails to 
specify the findings of fact that the ALJ allegedly did not fully 
explain.  Rather Labelle contests each of the determinations made 
by the ALJ.  Our reading of the ALJ's opinion does not disclose 
the shortcomings of which Labelle complains.  We do not, however, 
reach or decide this issue in light of our holding that the ALJ 
applied the incorrect legal standard. 
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that the courts of appeal that have addressed this issue have 
uniformly rejected the Spese standard.  Labelle argues that the 
Third Circuit should likewise reject that standard. 
 Under 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d), when a miner files more than 
one claim for benefits, the later claims are merged with the 
first claim if the earlier claim is still pending.  If an earlier 
claim has been denied, however, a later claim must likewise be 
denied "unless the [District Director] determines that there has 
been a material change in conditions or the later claim is a 
request for modification and the requirements of § 725.310 are 
met."  20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).  Section 725.310 permits the 
District Director, "at any time before one year from the date of 
the last payment of benefits, or at any time before one year 
after the denial of a claim, [to] reconsider the terms of an 
award or denial of benefits."  Id. at § 725.310(a).  Therefore, 
because Swarrow filed his second claim on October 2, 1989, more 
than one year after the denial of his first claim on February 21, 
1986, Swarrow must establish a material change in conditions. 
 Neither the BLBA nor its associated regulations explicitly 
define "a material change in conditions."  However, in Spese,0 
the BRB interpreted section 725.309 to require that the claimant 
submit "evidence which is relevant and probative so that there is 
a reasonable possibility that it would change the prior 
administrative result."  Spese, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) at 1-176; 
                     
0An appeal of the Board's decision was taken to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, but was dismissed with 
prejudice by stipulation.  See Spese v. Peabody Coal Co., No. 
88-3309 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 1989) (order). 
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see also Shupink v. LTV Steel Co., 17 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-24, 
1-27 (1992); Rice v. Sahara Coal Co., 15 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 
1-19, 1-21 (1990) (en banc).  In Shupink, the BRB reaffirmed 
Spese and explained that under the Spese formulation, the ALJ 
examines only the favorable new evidence and does not weigh the 
favorable evidence against unfavorable new evidence.  Shupink, 17 
Black Lung Rep. at 1-28.  See also Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 
F.3d 993, 997 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Spese standard as "a plain 
misreading of the regulation [i.e. 20 C.F.R.309(d)] . . . ." 
Sahara Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 946 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 
1991) (Posner, J.).  Characterizing the Spese framework as 
"mak[ing] mincemeat of res judicata," the Seventh Circuit 
declared that "the [BRB] had confused a change in the claimant's 
condition with the presentation of newly discovered evidence that 
might justify reopening the case as under Rule 60(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."  Id. 
 In criticizing Spese, the Sahara court voiced its concern 
that the doctrine of finality, an integral aspect of res 
judicata, not be eroded by a subsequent application for black 
lung benefits.  As recited by the Sahara court,  
[i]t is not enough that the new application is 
supported by new evidence of disease or disability, 
because such evidence might show merely that the 
original denial was wrong, and would thereby constitute 
an impermissible collateral attack on that denial. 
 
Id. 
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 In place of the Spese/Shupink standard, which looked only to 
an evaluation of favorable new evidence, the Seventh Circuit 
offered its own definition of "material change": 
A material change in conditions means either that the 
miner did not have black lung disease at the time of 
the first application but has since contracted it and 
become totally disabled by it, or that his disease has 
progressed to the point of becoming totally disabling 
although it was not at the time of the first 
application. 
 
Id.   
 Recently, the Fourth Circuit, in Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, 
OWCP, adopted the Sahara0 standard over competing formulations. 
57 F.3d 402, 407 (4th Cir. 1995).  The BRB, however, has refused 
to acquiesce to the circuit courts' rejection of Spese, instead 
adhering to its discredited definition of "material change."  See 
Shupink, 17 Black Lung Rep. at 1-27 (stating that the Board would 
continue to apply Spese "except [in cases] arising within the 
jurisdiction of the . . . Seventh Circuit."). 
 We agree with our sister circuits that Spese confuses the 
standard for modification of a decision with the standard for new 
claims based on "a material change in conditions."   
 The Director, while not agreeing with Labelle's res judicata 
argument, does agree with Labelle that the ALJ erred in following 
Spese.  The Director, however, urges us to adopt a different 
standard than the standard enunciated in Sahara: 
Under the Director's interpretation, the ALJ must 
consider all of the new evidence, favorable and 
unfavorable, and determine whether the miner has proven 
                     
0The Sahara standard is also commonly referred to as the McNew 
standard because Mr. McNew was the claimant in Sahara. 
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at least one of the elements of entitlement previously 
adjudicated against him.  If the miner establishes the 
existence of that element, he has demonstrated, as a 
matter of law, a material change.  Then the ALJ must 
consider whether all of the record evidence, including 
that submitted with the previous claims, supports a 
finding of entitlement to benefits. 
 
Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 The Sixth Circuit recently embraced the Director's proposed 
standard after considering the Spese and Sahara standards.  See 
id. at 998.  The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Sahara 
standard was "a reasonable interpretation of material change," 
id. at 997, but deferred to the DOL's interpretation, accurately 
noting that "courts must defer to the agency 'entrusted by 
Congress to make such policy determinations.'"  Id. at 998 
(quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 
(1991)). 
 Notably, "[b]ecause the black lung regulations are issued by 
the [OWCP] rather than by the [BRB], it is to the former body 
rather than the latter tha[t] we owe the usual deference that 
courts give agencies' interpretations of their own regulations or 
governing statutes."  Sahara, 949 F.2d at 557.  See also Potomac 
Elec. Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 (1980); 
Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1527 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Saginaw Mining Co. v. Mazzulli, 818 F.2d 1278, 1283 
(6th Cir. 1987); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 766 
F.2d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 Of course, deference to an agency's interpretation of its 
own regulations is warranted only when the interpretation is 
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reasonable.  Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).  We may supply our own 
construction of a regulation if the agency's interpretation is 
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 
Lukosevicz v. Director, OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quotations omitted). 
 Labelle argues that the Director's interpretation is not 
faithful to the purpose or language of section 725.309(d) 
(material change in condition) and that we should consequently 
reject the Director's interpretation.  We disagree.  Adoption of 
the Director's interpretation accords with the principle that 
courts should liberally construe remedial legislation, such as 
the BLBA, so as to include the largest number of claimants within 
its entitlement provisions.  See Pavesi v. Director, OWCP, 758 
F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1985); Echo v. Director, OWCP, 744 F.2d 
327, 330 (3d Cir. 1984).  Because the Director's construction of 
its own regulation is not unreasonable, deference should be given 
to that interpretation. 
 
VI. 
 Lastly, Swarrow urges us to affirm the ALJ's award of 
benefits, even if we conclude that the ALJ applied the wrong 
standard, under the theory that the error was harmless.  We 
cannot agree with that disposition.  The ALJ may very well 
decide, on remand, that all of the new evidence, favorable and 
unfavorable, on balance, satisfies (or does not satisfy) the 
Sharondale standard defining "a material change in conditions." 
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If no material change is found, then Swarrow cannot pursue his 
second claim.  On the other hand, if the ALJ finds that Swarrow 
has proved "at least one of the new elements previously 
adjudicated against him," Sharondale, 42 F.3d at 997, Swarrow 
will have demonstrated a material change.  At that point, the ALJ 
must consider all of the record evidence, including that 
submitted with the prior claim, to determine whether such 
evidence supports a finding of entitlement to benefits.  These 
determinations, however, must be made in the first instance by an 
ALJ. 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the BRB's September 15, 1994 
award of benefits to Swarrow, with the direction that Swarrow's 
claim be remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
  
